by Soha Lang | Oct 7, 2016 | Blog News, Publications
On October 6, 2016, the Washington Supreme Court issued an important 5-4 decision holding that a wrongful death action is extinguished if the statute of limitations has run on the decedent’s own cause of action by the time of his death. Deggs v. Asbestos Corp., et al., Wash. Sup. Ct. No. 91969-1 (October 6, 2016). The majority rejected plaintiff’s claim that—regardless whether the statute had run on decedent’s own claims prior to death—the heirs’ cause of action for wrongful death cannot arise until after the decedent’s death.
The decedent in Deggs had filed a lawsuit in 1999 against nearly 40 defendants claiming asbestos-related injury. He settled with some defendants, and won a judgment at trial of $1,511,900 against the last remaining defendant. He died nine years later, and within three years of death, the personal representative of his estate filed a wrongful death action based on the alleged asbestos-related injury, naming one defendant who was named in decedent’s prior action, and a host of new defendants who were not. The trial court granted a motion to dismiss on the grounds that decedent’s cause of action for asbestos-related injuries had lapsed by the time of his death, precluding the heirs from bringing a wrongful death action. The Washington Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal.
Justice Stephens wrote a vigorous dissent to the majority opinion by the Washington Supreme Court, joined by three other justices. The dissent maintained that the wrongful death action is a “free-standing cause of action for family members that cannot arise before the death of their loved one.” It further complained that despite acknowledging its decision was based on incorrect precedent, the majority “sees no harm in perpetuating its topsy-turvy illogic.”
This decision should prevent the practice by some plaintiffs’ firms of recycling old claims by filing new wrongful death actions against the same or different defendants years after the decedent filed his own lawsuit or allowed his cause of action to lapse.
(October 6, 2016)
Soha and Lang attorneys are available to assist insurer clients in understanding and addressing the impact of this decision both during the claims handling process and after an allegation of bad faith claims handling has been made.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Soha and Lang, P.S. or its clients.
by Soha Lang | Sep 14, 2016 | Blog News, Publications
On September 13, 2016, Soha & Lang, P.S. attorney Jennifer Dinning took and passed her first CPCU exam, CPCU 500 Foundations of Risk Management and Insurance. Jennifer is one of three Soha & Lang, P.S. attorneys on the path to obtaining the CPCU designation. In addition, one of our shareholders, Paul Rosner, J.D., CPCU, is active in the Pacific Northwest Chapter and nationally. Soha & Lang, P.S. attorneys are also frequent speakers at chapter meetings and All-Industry Days of the Pacific Northwest (Western Washington), Spokane and Oregon chapters of the CPCU Society.
by Jennifer Dinning | Jun 14, 2016 | Blog News, Publications
On June 9, 2016, in the matter of Lui v Essex Ins. Co. (WA Sup. Ct. No. 91779-9), the Washington Supreme Court ruled that a Change of Conditions Endorsement in a commercial property insurance policy precluded coverage for water damage to a vacant building.
There was no dispute regarding the relevant facts. After a tenant moved out of the insured building, a frozen sprinkler pipe burst causing substantial water damage to the building. The building owner submitted a claim to its insurer. The insurer issued payment for property damage. However, it later discovered that the building had been vacant at the time of the damage and refused to issue further payment based upon the following Change of Conditions Endorsement:
Coverage under this policy is suspended while a described building, whether intended for occupancy by owner or tenant, is vacant or unoccupied beyond a period of sixty consecutive days, unless permission for such vacancy or unoccupancy is granted hereon in writing and an additional premium is paid for such vacancy or unoccupancy.
Effective at the inception of any vacancy or unoccupancy, the Causes of Loss provided by this policy are limited to Fire, Lightning, Explosion, Windstorm or Hail, Smoke, Aircraft or Vehicles, Riot or Civil Commotion, unless prior approval has been obtained from the Company.
The insurer took the position that coverage did not exist because the endorsement immediately suspended coverage at the inception of any vacancy for all but specifically named causes of loss and water damage was not one of the named causes of loss.
The insured argued that the endorsement did not apply to limit coverage until the covered property had been vacant for more than 60 consecutive days. The Washington Supreme Court sided with the insurer. The court held that under the endorsement when a building becomes vacant, coverage is limited to loss resulting from the specified causes of loss and, after a 60 consecutive day vacancy, the policy provides no coverage. Accordingly, the court held the policy barred coverage for the water damage in this case.
Soha and Lang attorneys are available to assist insurer clients in understanding and addressing the impact of this decision both during the claims handling process and after an allegation of bad faith claims handling has been made.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Soha and Lang, P.S. or its clients.
by Sarah Davenport | Dec 12, 2015 | Blog News, Publications
On December 10, 2015, the Washington Supreme Court affirmatively answered the following certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington:
- Does the Washington Consumer Protection Act (“CPA”) create a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts?
- Does the Washington Consumer Protection Act create a cause of action for an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its in-state agent?
The Plaintiff, Sandra C. Thornell, in this putative class action lawsuit is a Texas resident. Ms. Thornell’s son was involved in a car accident in Texas, and the other motorist was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”), a corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois. State Farm paid for the damages to its insured’s vehicle, and then pursued Ms. Thornell for an unliquidated claim based on subrogated interest from its insured. Ms. Thornell alleged that she received three deceptive debt collection letters from Seattle Service Bureau Inc. (SSB), a corporation with its principal place of business in Washington, pursuant to the referral of unliquidated subrogation claims to SSB by State Farm.
The Washington Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative. Addressing Question 1, the Supreme Court noted that the CPA provides “‘[a]ny person’ can sue for a violation”, “‘[c]ommerce’ includes ‘any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington’”, and “the CPA ‘shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served’” (emphasis in original). The court stated that a broad reading of this language is appropriate and supported by prior case law, and that it does not matter whether “commerce” is out-of-state if it affects the “people of the state of Washington,” even indirectly. Therefore, the court held “[t]he CPA does allow claims for an out-of-state plaintiff against all persons who engage in unfair or deceptive acts that directly or indirectly affect the people of Washington”.
Addressing Question 2, the Supreme Court gave a brief summary of the general rule of an agency relationship, and concluded that “[t]he ‘fact’ that the principal in this case is an out-of-state entity does not change this. A principal cannot send agents into a state to commit CPA violations in order to avoid liability by virtue of its out-of-state residence.” The Supreme Court clarified that the United States District Court would have to determine whether an agency relationship existed.
Soha and Lang attorneys are available to assist insurer clients in understanding and addressing the impact of this decision.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Soha and Lang, P.S. or its clients.
by Soha Lang | Nov 25, 2015 | Blog News, Publications
On November 4, 2015, Soha & Lang Shareholder Paul Rosner, J.D., CPCU was awarded the 2014-2015 Ralph Boden Award for Excellence by the Pacific Northwest Chapter of the CPCU Society. The award was created to honor Ralph Boden’s long term commitment to the CPCU society and its mission of promoting excellence through ethical behavior and continuing education. The award, which was presented during the chapter’s All Industry Day, recognizes Paul’s continuing commitment to insurance education both locally and nationally.
by Geoff Bedell | Nov 24, 2015 | Blog News, Publications
On November 19, 2015, the Oregon Supreme Court overruled forty-year-old precedent holding that a plaintiff’s covenant not to execute a judgment obtained in a settlement with an insured-defendant extinguishes the insured-defendant’s liability to the plaintiff and, by extension, the liability of the defendant’s insurer, as well.
In Brownstone Homes Condo. Assn. v. Brownstone Forest Hts. et al, No. SC S061273255 (Or Nov 19, 2015), a homeowners association (“Association”) sued a siding subcontractor, A&T, for negligence and breach of contract. A&T had two insurers: Zurich and Capitol. Capitol initially undertook a defense of the action, but later declined to defend or indemnify A&T. The Association, A&T and Zurich settled the claim without Capitol’s participation. Under the settlement, A&T agreed to a stipulated judgment of $2 million, of which Zurich paid $900,000. The Association agreed not to execute on A&T’s assets, and A&T assigned its claims against Capitol to the Association. The settlement agreement was entered on March 14, 2008 and judgment was entered on November 13, 2008. Subsequent to entry of judgment, the Association filed a garnishment proceeding against Capitol seeking the $1.1 million balance. The trial court dismissed the garnishment action based on Stubblefield v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 267 Or 397, 517 P2d 262 (1973), which held that a stipulated settlement, coupled with a covenant not to execute, extinguished liability. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. On further review, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the court expressly overruled Stubblefield:
In short, we conclude that Stubblefield erred when it concluded that a covenant not to execute obtained in exchange for an assignment of rights, by itself, effects a complete release that extinguishes an insured’s liability and, by extension, the insurer’s liability as well. It necessarily follows that the trial court in this case likewise erred in concluding that the existence of such a covenant not to execute as a component of the parties’ settlement agreement had the effect of extinguishing A&T’s liability to [the Association] and, as a result, had the effect of extinguishing Capitol’s liability as well.
Accordingly, under Oregon law, a covenant not to execute on a judgment obtained in exchange for an assignment of rights against the judgment debtor’s insurance carrier, does not, by itself, extinguish an insured’s liability and, thus, does not extinguish the insurance carrier’s obligation for the consent judgment. The court specifically limited its ruling to this narrow issue, declining to address, for example, whether collusion or fraud in the settlement may supply grounds for rejecting a stipulated or consent settlement.
Soha and Lang attorneys are available to assist insurer clients in understanding and addressing the impact of this decision both during the claims handling process and after an allegation of bad faith claims handling has been made.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in in this blog are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Soha and Lang, P.S. or its clients.
